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ABUSES OF ATTORNEYS' COMPUTER
DATA BASES THREATEN
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
The legal field is now subject to computer abuses which have
plagued the general business world. Attorneys are using computers to
store confidential information, perform legal analysis, and generate
legal documents.1 Such use creates a risk that files and confidential information stored in computers will be subject to a variety of computer
abuses, including unauthorized access, theft, alteration or destructionproblems widely publicized within the business world. 2 Attorneys have
a professional responsibility to maintain the confidentiality of client
data. Failure to do so may harm a client or benefit unscrupulous third
parties. Many law office computers, however, have no protections, or
3
inadequate protections, against computer abuses.
This Note will examine the general problem of computer abuse and
the potential for such abuse in the legal field. Computer abuse is defined in this Note as any unauthorized access to, or use of, a computer
or its data bases. 4 Computer abuse has traditionally involved the theft
1. Poore & Brockman, The Threats to Computer Security, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1985,
at 14, col. 1; see, e.g., Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122,
1134 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (using a computer generated econometric model in anti-trust litigation); Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 180 U.S.P.Q. 673 (D. Minn. May 26, 1976) (using numbered narrative statement, designated supporting and opposing evidence, and
cumulative lists and indices of exhibits generated and maintained in computer storage);
IBM Peripherals, 5 Computer L. Reporter 879 (N.D. Cal. 1975), (using a computerized
trial support system); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1364 (1976) (use of an outside data processing firm); Soma & Youngs, Cornfudential
Communication and Information in a Computer Era, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 849 (1984).
2. See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Computer Crime: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 18, 1983); Privacy and 1984: Public Opinionson Privacy
Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Information, Justice and Agriculture of
the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 4, 1984) (hereinafter
PrivacyHearing); D. PARKER, S. NYCUM & S. OuRA, COMPUTER ABUSE (1973); Note, Com-

puter Abuse: the Emerging Crime and the Need for Legislation, 12 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.
73 (1984); Clymer, Privacy Threats Worry Americans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1983, at D24,
col. 1.
3. Poore & Brocknan, supra note 1, at 14, col. 1.
4. For a variety of definitions of computer abuse, see Note, supra note 2, at 74-75
(1984).
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of data, unauthorized use of computer software and equipment, embezzlement of tangible and intangible assets, destruction of computer data
or equipment, and ransoming of computer assets. 5 Attorneys who use
computers, especially computers which can be accessed by unauthorized
individuals through the telephone lines, could be subject to any of these
illegal practices. Most troubling, however, is the potential attack on
stored information. Information storage and manipulation are the most
prevalent purposes for which attorneys use computers. Unwarranted
disclosure, alteration, or destruction of this vital, and often confidential,
information can harm clients.
The legal system supports and relies upon strict confidentiality and
accurate detail. This Note will describe current confidentiality requirements for attorneys, sanctions which can be imposed upon attorneys for
failing to reasonably protect confidential data, and sanctions which can
be imposed upon individuals for the unauthorized access, theft, alteration, or destruction of confidential information. It will then suggest
that neither current confidentiality requirements, nor criminal and civil
sanctions adequately protect clients from the abuse of confidential
information when lawyers use computers. This is especially true when
computers can be accessed through the telephone lines. Finally, this
Note will recommend further protections and means of implementation.
I.
A.

COMPUTER ABUSE
GENERAL BUSINESS ABUSE

Computer abuse is a serious and increasing problem, yet there are
no reliable statistics regarding the frequency or severity of such occurrences.6 Developing complete and reliable statistics on computer abuse
is difficult for several reasons. First, computer abuses are often undetected and, therefore, unreported. Even when abuse is discovered,
many businesses do not report it because they want to avoid disclosing
to the public the vulnerable aspects of their computer systems. They
fear making future attacks upon their own computer easier for others.
Second, businesses fear that publicity about computer abuse techniques
might encourage and increase such abuse overall. Third, most crime
statistics are gathered from police arrest or conviction records. 7 Computer abuse has been prosecuted under numerous statutes, including
fraud and wiretapping, not traditionally associated with computer
abuse. Thus, statisticians would have the laborious task of sifting
5. D. PARKER, supra note 2, at 91-112.

6.
PUTER

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME: COM-

SECURrrY TECHNIQUES 1 (1982).

7. Id.
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through individual crime reports to find computer crime information
and, even then, some crime reports might omit such details.
Studies show that types of computer abuse vary greatly, and that
the amount of harm from such abuse is significant. A study conducted
at Stanford University collected and attempted to verify reports of computer abuse.8 The study revealed that most businesses have experienced problems involving vandalism, theft of information or property,
fraud, or unauthorized use, access, or sale of computer time or data. 9
Some examples from this study illustrate the nature of the problem:
(1) "Programmer altered a program to cause a computer to print fictitious credit notes for cigarette coupons and sent to his address;"' 1
(2) "Computer operators of a consulting firm rendered useless the subscription list of a magazine;"" (3) "An employee destroyed on-line data
files after being given notice of termination;' ' 12 (4) "A former employee
of a time-sharing service is alleged to have made unauthorized access to
3
extract confidential data over a long distance circuit from Cincinnati;'
(5) "Two employees of a U. S. economic data collection firm extracted
and sold data;'114 (6) "Students held the Atomic Energy Commission
u5
computer for $100,000 ransom.'
In acts of crimes or abuse, computers serve as the target, tool, accomplice, or scapegoat.' 6 Protections should address all forms of attack,
since each can be equally harmful to the businesses and clients involved. As a target, a computer's programs and data may be stolen, vandalized, or simply used without authorization. As a tool for access and
transfer, a computer facilitates the commission of crimes, such as theft
or embezzlement. As an accomplice, the computer does not participate
in, but is used to plan the commission of a crime. Finally, as a scapegoat, a computer is simply blamed for wrongful acts to avoid the wrongdoer's personal responsibility.
Statistics reveal that computer abuse exists in each of the above
forms. Only the first, computer as a target, relates specifically to the
threat to confidential information maintained in attorneys' computers.
The future, however, promises more extensive application of computers
in business and in the legal field. More computer network systems will
be used, and more transactions will be conducted between computers
8. D. PARKER, supra note 2.
9. Id. at 14-17, 91-112.
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rather than between people. Attorneys will undoubtedly be involved in
all of these aspects on behalf of their clients, and risks that perhaps do
not currently exist will arise in the future. Business people, attorneys,
and policy makers must plan for this expansion, and develop protections for all forms of abuse.
B.

POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE IN THE LEGAL FIELD

Information becomes valuable to others when it can be used to
make a profit, increase power or control over others, enhance political
advantages, give voice to a complaint or vindicate a perceived wrong, or
increase the effectiveness of an overzealous employee. 17 Information
that does not appear on its face to create a target for computer abuse
may actually do so becauseeof its confidential character. If the information is private or confidential, clients may feel embarrassed by disclosure, lose a strategic advantage, or even lose a lawsuit in which they
otherwise would have prevailed.
In the course of seeking effective representation, clients must often
give attorneys information that they would not want others to have.
Examples of such information include addresses and telephone numbers, financial information, trade secrets, tax and business planning information and other confidential or secret data. Such information could
be valuable to others for any of the reasons mentioned above. Furthermore, such information, and the work product and strategic planning
conducted by the attorney, would be especially valuable to an adversary.
Although attorney work product is not available to an adversary
through the normal discovery process, an unscrupulous attorney could
acquire the opposition's confidential records through illegal computer
access. Such knowledge would unfairly benefit the unscrupulous attorney's client to the detriment of the opposing party. There is no reason
to believe that the legal profession will be, or is, immune from computer abuses.
The United States Department of Justice has attempted to identify
some special risks involved in individual applications of computers.' 8
Some of the special risks that apply to computer systems used by attorneys, because of the value of the stored information, are intentional or
accidental disclosure, modification, and destruction or use of personal or
sensitive data, records, or trade secrets. The violation of confidentiality
rules, personal data regulations and privacy laws were also identified.
17. A common example is the unauthorized transfer of funds through illegal access to
bank computers. Opportunities for such illegal use of computers will continue to increase
as computer applications expand. R. TURN, PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN PERSONAL INFORMATION vi (1974).
18. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 10-11.
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The threat to computer confidentiality may even be greater in the
legal field than in general business. Attorneys are generally unfamiliar
with computer processes or security, and often do not use a computer
security system at all.19 The Department of Justice reported that "dangers lurk not where losses have been anticipated and good controls exist, but where vulnerabilities have not been anticipated and controls are
lacking." 20 The problem is that security "cost[s] money without visible,
direct contributions to performance."'21 It is difficult to convince some
people that a potential for harm is a sufficient reason to take action.
This was a primary issue in the Federal computer crime legislation debate.22 Opposing parties or counsel, investigators, or unrelated persons
who feel that the information might benefit them could access a client's
personal or confidential data. A recent survey revealed that forty-five
percent of known computer abusers were either competitors or unre23
lated, unknown individuals.
Computers also increase the risk that employees or previous employees may steal, modify, or divulge information. As opposed to computer files, paper files are much less accessible and amenable to
interpretation and collation. It is more difficult to detect the existence
of data in a paper file because physical searching is necessary. It is also
more difficult to gain access to physical files maintained in varied and
locked locations. Furthermore, it is more difficult simply to assimilate
and interpret data when it is in a raw, hard file form. 24 A disgruntled
or unscrupulous employee or former employee is able to alter, copy, or
steal information more easily when it is in the form of computer data.
But why would this occur? The motivations are unlimited: anger at a
client or the attorney, promise of financial gain (for example, by selling
the information or using the information to blackmail someone), promise of strategic advantage (advance notice of an investment opportunity
or political use), the simple challenge of it, or even overzealousness. 25
Another area vulnerable to abuse in attorneys' computer use involves the transmission of data. Abusers can intercept or eavesdrop
when computer data is sent over the telephone lines to other computer
terminals. 26 This type of computer abuse, whether intentional or inadvertent, results in an unauthorized person possessing the information.
19. Poore & Brockman, supra note 1, at 14, col. 2.
20. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 4.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Privacy Hearing,supra note 2, at 2.
23. Task Force on Computer Crime, Report on Computer Crime, 1984 A.B.A. SEC.
CRIM. JUST.

24. R. TURN, supra note 17, at 2.
25. See generally id. at vi.
26. M. SCOT, COMPUTER LAW § 7.41 (1984).
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The sender may not even be aware that that person has gathered the
information.
Some hypothetical situations, drawn from reported computer abuse
in other fields, will clarify the types of risks attorneys face. First, Secretary has been offered $10,000 for a list of names and addresses of all
of the attorneys' clients. This will benefit Third Party who will use the
information to prepare a mailing list to advertise and solicit sales for a
product or service. Secretary can obtain the list by pushing just a few
computer keys. The list is prepared and delivered; the abuse is undetected by the attorney and) her clients. The Internal Revenue Service
only incidentally discovers the abuse when investigating the unreported
receipt of money by Secretary. Client's privacy interests have been invaded, and would have gone undetected.
Second, Investigator has been hired to discover an individual's assets. She gains access to tax planning strategies and confidential information in an attorney's computer through the use of a modem and the
telephone lines. Several bank accounts and interests in land are discovered and used by Third Party. Client's privacy and perhaps financial interests have been harmed, but the unauthorized access is not detected.
Third, Computer Programmer has just been given notice of termination, is angry, and programs that computer to destroy all client files
one month after she has gone. The program is not discovered until after all of the information is lost.
Fourth, Unscrupulous Attorney is involved in a complex lawsuit
which, if won, could recover millions of dollars for her client and a substantial contingency fee for the law firm. Attorney knows that Defendant's Lawyers have been using a computer to strategize and organize
masses of critical information. Some of the information has been obtained through the discovery process, but Defendant's Lawyers' work
product is not discoverable. Attorney has a home computer with a
modem, has taken a few computer courses in college, and knows that
she can gain access to the information through the telephone lines with
only an access code. She programs her computer to try all permutations
of numbers until the correct code is discovered. As expected, Attorney
gets all of the information. The defendant and the legal system have
been violated.
The risks of abuse increase with the widespread use of computers,
and the use of small, dedicated computers, called modems, which link
data communication circuits. "By proper utilization of modems ...and
ordinary telephone lines, it is possible to establish powerful . . . net-

works of... computers.1 27 Small office and home computers, in numbers estimated at five million for 1985, can be connected to telephone
27. D. PARKER, supra note 2, at 21-22.
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computer networks. 28 A user need only know, or discover through trial
and error, a telephone number and access code to access a computer
through a modem.- 9
II.

CURRENT REQUIREMENTS OF CONFIDENTIALITY

Confidentiality is at the core of an attorney's duty. Canon 4 and
ABA Model Rule 1.630 require that attorneys maintain their clients'
confidences and secrets. Confidences are communications received from
a client in the course of the attorney-client relationship, and are also
protected by the law of attorney-client privilege. Secrets are information about a client gathered during representation. There are few exceptions to the confidentiality rule.
There are two basic rationales for requiring confidentiality. First, it
is presumed that the advocacy system operates best when both sides are
advocating and presenting their positions fully. Attorneys must have all
31
relevant information to best represent the interests of their clients.
Without the full story, attorneys cannot represent clients to the clients'
utmost advantage. Confidentiality is necessary because clients would
otherwise withhold information that they believed was harmful.
Second is a dignity rationale. Clients' dignity is furthered when
their attorneys act completely in the clients' interest. Society values
highly dignity and autonomy; the law must give preeminence to these
32
values. The attorney acts as a friend of clients, giving clients dignity.
This dignity is further strengthened by the assurance of complete
confidentiality.
The professional codes and rules governing attorneys are enforced
by the state bar in each state and, in some circumstances, by the courts.
Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code 33 set forth any guidelines
for protecting confidential information maintained in computers. Such
protection has been left to the discretion of attorneys within the general
bounds of confidentiality requirements.
It is the ABA's policy to interpret standards to permit (1) the use of
modern business practices, and, (2) assuming that reasonable care is
28. Federal Computer Systems Protection Act: Hearing on HR 3970 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th

Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1982). (William A. Bayse, Assistant Director, Technical Services Division, Federal

Bureau of Investigation)

[hereinafter Protection Act

Hearing].
29. M. ScoTT, supra note 26, § 1.9.
30. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).

31. People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975).
32. C. Fried, Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Rela-

tionship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060-89 (1976).
33. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY

(amended 1982).
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taken, the use of computers.34 For example, the ABA has decided that
attorneys have no duty to inform their clients that an outside computer
agency will be used and will have access to clients' confidential data.35
It is clear, however, from the ABA and various state bar opinions involving computer use, that balancing the problem of computer abuse,
confidentiality, and efficiency has been difficult and may not yet be
settled.
III.
A.

CURRENT PROTECTIONS AND SANCTIONS

PROTECTIONS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST ATTORNEYS FOR FAILING
TO TAKE ADEQUATE PRECAUTIONS

There are some sanctions which can be imposed on attorneys that
fail to take reasonable precautions to protect confidential client data.
State agencies which license attorneys have the power to impose sanctions upon attorneys for failing to act in accordance with professional
codes and rules.36 The major flaw in this protection, is that a large percentage of computer abuse is never detected.3 7 The ability to impose
sanctions requires the detection of abuse. Detection requires effective
auditing of attorney's security provisions, and this is currently not done.
The common law also provides a cause of action in tort for the negligent use of a computer. Those who use computers must do so with
care.38 A client who has suffered from a lack of computer protections
would have to establish all of the elements of a cause of action in tort,
including duty, breach of duty, causation and damage. 39 To do so, a client must be aware that some computer abuse has occurred. As with
protection through required confidentiality, protection through tort law
is dampened by the low probability of detecting computer abuses. Clients cannot prove a tort lawsuit without detecting the abuse; in fact,
they would not even know to initiate the lawsuit. Further, some types
of harm would be difficult to value, such as invasion of privacy.
The risk of a malpractice lawsuit is another potential protection for
confidential computer information. Attorneys must maintain the same
standard of care as similar professionals. 40 Courts sometimes use a reasonable conduct standard and, other times, an ordinary conduct stan34. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1127 (1970).
See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1364 (1976).
35. Id.
36. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope (1983).

37. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.

38. M. SCOTT, supra note 26, § 7.18.
39. M. SCOTT, supra note 26, §§ 7.2, 7.7-7.18.
40. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 17-19.
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dard. 41 An ordinary conduct standard would not provide much
protection at present, since many, if not most, attorneys have inadequate security protections. The reasonable conduct standard could provide some protection, but the lack of reasonable care in providing
computer security would have to be discovered. This would not occur
unless some computer abuse was discovered, an event that is often unlikely. Michael D. Scott further contends that the courts are not prepared to deal with computer issues. 42 Judges may know so little about
computers, computer security devices, and computer abuse that they
may be reluctant to find an attorney guilty of malpractice for a similar
lack of knowledge in a technical area. On the other hand, judges routinely find malpractice in medicine and automotive design with a similar lack of technical knowledge.
Finally, even if an attorney is ultimately sanctioned for inadequately protecting client confidences and secrets, the client has been
harmed and one of the legal system's core requirements compromised.
The legal profession must follow some reasonable standards to protect
confidential data before harm has occurred, and this is not a current
practice.
B.

SANCTIONS AGAINST COMPUTER ABUSERS

There are criminal sanctions which can apply to computer abuse,
and these can be used potentially against individuals who unlawfully access attorneys' computers. A few states have specific computer crime
statutes, 43 but most computer abuse must fit into other crime categories. 44 Access to a computer by improper means to commit a criminal
act is a crime in some states.45 There are also some federal criminal
statutes under which computer abuse sanctions could be sought, includ46
ing wire fraud statutes, embezzlement, and theft statutes.
The current criminal laws' inadequacy in dealing with computer
abuse in all of its forms has been widely discussed. 4 7 When the issue
regarding which statute the computer abuse might be prosecuted under
arises, however, the client has already been harmed. Since confidential41. McLean v. Rankin, 41 Or. App. 3, 596 P.2d 1329 (1979).
42. M. ScoTT, supra note 26, § 1.4.
43. M. Scor, supra note 26, § 8.17. For a specific example of a computer crime statute, see Cal. Penal Code § 502 (West Supp. 1983).

44. M. ScoTT, supra note 26, § 8.5.
45. M. ScoTT, supra note 26, § 8.18.
malicious mischief. Id.

Examples include theft, telephone abuse, and

46. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982); 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 659 (1976).
47. D. PARKER, supra note 2, at 5-6, 55-59; Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right
to Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893 (1984); ProtectionAct
Hearing,supra note 33, at 3.
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ity is a core requirement of the legal profession, 48 and is necessary to
protect the system and the dignity of the individuals involved, 49 protection should not be left to the mere possibility that the criminal penalties may deter some criminals, even if obscurities in the criminal codes
did not exist. Furthermore, there is the ever present risk that computer abuse will not be detected, or could not be proven against particular individuals.
Potential tort claims to remedy the effects of computer abuse include conversion, interference with economic relations, fraud, and invasion of privacy.5 0 Pursuing rights under tort law involves the problem
that the tort may not be discovered. Furthermore, costs of pursuing
legal action can be prohibitive. In addition, damages may neither (1) reflect the total harm to the client (for example, embarrassment), (2) reflect the harm to the legal system, nor (3) be sufficient to deter the
particular computer abuser.
The federal legislature has recognized the problems inherent in relying upon deterrence from criminal and civil penalties to curb computer abuses and protect privacy, and has enacted legislation to protect
individuals in a few areas. Legislation aimed at protecting individuals
from computer abuses before they occur includes the Fair Credit Reporting Act 5 ' and the Privacy Act. 52 There is also legislation governing
financial institutions. 53 The Fair Credit Reporting Act was enacted to
ensure that consumers are treated with fairness, impartiality and privacy. 54 It states that "an elaborate mechanism has been developed for
investigating and evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing,
credit capacity, character, and general reputation of consumers. '55 The
fear of computer abuse was a motivating factor in bringing about the
legislation. Some of the protections provided by these Acts include limited dissemination and protection from unauthorized access, the right to
know that data is being maintained, and the right to access and challenge data. These protection requirements have been codified into law
despite computers in these fields having had consistent security
protections.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
49.

See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.

50. M. SCOTT, supra note 26, § 7.3.
51. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1681-1681t (1976).
52. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1974 & Supp. IV (1980)).
53. Financial Institutions Regulatory & Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-630, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat. 3641) 9273, 9305-06.
54. Fair Credit Reporting Act, supra note 51, § 1681(4).
55. Id.

§ 1681(2).
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IV. PROPOSED PROTECTIONS

Computers should not be used to manipulate and store private or
confidential information unless adequate security protections are afforded. Rein Turn describes the adverse effects that computer abuse
can have upon victims. 56 These include harm to a person's physical
safety, well-being, self-respect, solitude, liberty, right to refrain from
self-incrimination, mental well-being, privacy, strength of character,
economic security, and opportunities. Society must balance legitimate
business and information needs against protection of private and confidential information and the possibility of harm. A line must be drawn
to establish the appropriate level of protection between the two extremes-i.e., prohibiting maintaining information in computer data
banks versus allowing complete freedom to store and manipulate information without protection requirements.
This balancing process requires that a realistic value be placed upon
the information. A sensitivity scale should take factors such as type of
information, potential value to others, potential harm from unauthorized disclosure, use, or manipulation, and the purpose or need for keeping the information in the computer into account. Other factors that
may be useful in drawing this line include customer or client consent,
value of the good or service provided, and legal or professional
requirements.
There are only a few instances in which absolute protection of confidential or private information should be given. Justice Brennan stated
in his Whalen v. Roe5 7 concurrence that the advancement of computer
technology might necessitate a judicial curb on that technology. He further stated, however, that reasonable security protections usually were
sufficient. 58 The Court noted that the right to collect and use information through computers is usually accompanied by a statutory or regula59
tory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosure.
The balancing cannot be left completely to each attorney. The
risks are too great that individuals and the system may be harmed. The
United States Department of Justice has recommended using a baseline
concept for establishing computer security protections.6 0 A basic level
of protection should be set which all attorneys would be required to
meet. Security levels below the baseline would place a stringent burden
upon the attorneys to prove adequacy. For example, a baseline could
require that all attorneys place confidential information into their com56.
57.
58.
59.

R. TURN, supra note 17, at 29.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Id. at 607.
Id. at 605.

60. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 35-36.
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puters in code. The information could, therefore, not be read by unauthorized individuals unless they could first access the information, and
then decipher it. Any attorney not complying with this baseline requirement would be presumed to be in violation of the law unless the
attorney showed that the security protections afforded were sufficient
(or superior to placing the information in code form). The baseline,
however, would be a minimum guide for attorneys generally unfamiliar
with computer security techniques. Further suggestions for protections
would be provided to bring the risks to a reasonable level. For example,
if unauthorized disclosure would be extremely harmful to a client or if
the information were very valuable, a reasonable level of protection
might require further limitations.
The baseline should be developed by a task force composed of computer experts and legal professionals, in a manner similar to that recommended for in-house security reviews. 6 ' The task force should serve
to review and identify general assets subject to loss, their value, the
consequences of loss, the types and level of risk, available protections
and their effectiveness, and alternative means of storing and manipulating the information. It should consider all threats, intentional, accidental, or negligent intrusion, destruction or manipulation of data, and
inappropriate data integrity. Once the baseline is established, periodic,
random reviews of attorneys' computer security techniques should be
made to assure integrity. The baseline, with reviews, would require
more monitoring of computer security than one mandatory level of security would, but the variation among risks is too great to establish a
single level of protection. Overprotection would be inefficient, and underprotection would unreasonably risk information exposure or
tampering.
The following protection factors should be included in the reviews
and baseline: (1) safeguards including notification of the existence of
the data base and the rights to inspect and amend; (2) procedures for
maintaining confidentiality, including increased anonymity, access control, and reduced exposure by collecting only necessary information;
(3) data security techniques including defensive hardware and software,
control over users' actions, and the use of cryptography in data files and
communication links; and (4) integrity management including proce62
dures for detecting errors and testing all systems.
Attorneys should be required by law to safeguard their clients'
rights when computers contain clients' private and confidential information. Attorneys should inform their clients regarding what information will be placed into computer data banks, and what types of security
61. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 12.

62. D. PARKER supra note 2, at vii-ix.
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measures will be used. Clients would then have the option of approving
the plan, negotiating with the attorney about parts of the plan, or choosing another attorney. Clients should always have the right to review
and correct any data. Such a client right also benefits attorneys who
must have reliable and complete information to adequately represent a
client's interests.
Procedures for maintaining confidentiality and data security techniques should vary, depending upon the sensitivity of the data to be
stored. The baseline would apply, and auditing would confirm necessary protections.
Maintaining data integrity is also important. Attorneys should be
required to maintain hard files to correct errors in the data base or replace information which might be accidentally or purposefully destroyed, altered, or improperly entered. Furthermore, attorneys should
make periodic reviews of the computer programmers' work and
methods.
A thorough analysis of any security device should also consider
components such as probability of deception, resistance to manipulation,
resistance to circumvention, detection, and time to detect. 63 Protections
must span all steps of data manipulation from input to storage and
transmittal. Auditing must be done by a responsible, knowledgeable,
and detached agency.
Some specific security controls have been identified by the Department of Justice. 64 Procedures to assure data integrity include staff accountability and usage rights for all data and data manipulation,
confirmation of receipt of hard copies, accountability for the accuracy,
safekeeping, and dissemination of data, suppression of incomplete and
obsolete data, and destruction of discarded hard copies. The physical security of the computer hardware and software should be provided by
locking doors, and, where necessary, guarding the interior. Access to
the areas where computers are kept should be minimized and, for some
sensitive types of data, sign-in and sign-out procedures should be
implemented.
Operations security provisions should include computer systems activity records, minimizing copying of sensitive data, employee identification on work product, data file and program backup, and backup of
power source. It would also be necessary to confirm trustworthiness of
employees.
Access controls could include elimination of dial-up access to the
computer, limiting dial-up access to regular business hours when responsible employees are present, removing sensitive data from dial-up
63. R. TURN, supra note 18, at 60-61.
64. BuRtEAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 12.
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access, implementing log in procedures, and limiting availability of the
telephone access numbers. Computer access and use should be monitored. If access is made, the computer should record automatically the
relevant identification. Finally, passwords should be used to further
protect sensitive data. These should be changed regularly and issued
discretely. Records of the passwords within the computer system
should be individually encrypted.
V.

IMPLEMENTING PROTECTIONS

The Federal government should enact legislation requiring attorneys to implement computer security protections when any confidential, private, or secret information involving a client is placed in the data
base. Actual development of a baseline, as discussed earlier, and enforcement should be done by a task force, set up by the government.
There is strong federal and public interest in this area. Loss of privacy
and confidentiality in legal services would detrimentally affect the advocacy system in the United States,65 as well as pose a threat to liberty,
autonomy, self-hood, and other human values. 66 The public has voiced
its concern in opinion polls about the effects of computers on privacy
67
and confidentiality.
Uniformity is also necessary and would require federal action. Interstate commerce relies upon the effective enforcement of laws, legal
rights and obligations. Lawsuits often involve individuals and businesses from different states. Individuals or businesses may have to hire
lawyers from other states to represent them. Differences among the
states in computer security requirements could adversely affect the
rights and interests of individuals and businesses. For example, a client
might hire a lawyer from another state, thinking that the lawyer is subject to the same computer security requirements as exist in the client's
own state. The client might therefore feel secure in divulging some
very sensitive data to the attorney to be placed into the computer data
banks. In reality, the attorney's state may not require any security devices. The information, which the client thought would be protected,
would not be secure.
The integrity of the Federal Court system is also the responsibility
of the federal government. Confidential information and attorney work
product must be protected for the reasons discussed in Section II of this
Note. The federal government cannot rely upon individual state protections; some states might not take any action to require security.
An alternative to federal legislation would be for the government
65. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
66. Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980).
67. Privacy Hearing,supra note 2, at 4-7.
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to appoint a task force to establish standards and develop a model act
which could be adopted by the states. This alternative, however, could
compromise uniformity and threaten security because states are not required to adopt model acts.
CONCLUSION
The legal field is subject to the increasing abuse of computer data
bases, thus exposing confidential and private information to unauthorized individuals. This threatens the legal system and the privacy, autonomy, and liberty of individuals. Attorneys have sometimes failed to
protect computer data, and generally lack sufficient familiarity with
computer processes and potential abuses to develop adequate protections. Furthermore, because protections are expensive, attorneys may
not develop protections against potential harms without government intervention. This Note has suggested that the Federal Government has
an interest in protecting privacy and the legal system, and should therefore investigate and establish security protection baselines and audit
computer systems used by attorneys.
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